The Curious Case of Inactive Bankruptcy Practice in China: A Comparative Study of U.S. and Chinese Bankruptcy Law by Yujia Jiang




The Curious Case of Inactive Bankruptcy Practice
in China: A Comparative Study of U.S. and Chinese
Bankruptcy Law
Yujia Jiang
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njilb
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business by an authorized administrator of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly
Commons.
Recommended Citation
Yujia Jiang, The Curious Case of Inactive Bankruptcy Practice in China: A Comparative Study of U.S. and Chinese Bankruptcy Law, 34 Nw.
J. Int'l L. & Bus. 559 (2014).
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njilb/vol34/iss3/5





The Curious Case of Inactive Bankruptcy Practice 
in China: A Comparative Study of U.S. and 
Chinese Bankruptcy Law 
 
By Yujia Jiang* 
 
Abstract: The current Chinese bankruptcy law has been enacted and effective for 
seven years, with academic discussions and judicial decisions emerging at a rapid 
speed.  However, reorganization practice in China is considerably less active than 
that in the United States.  This Note provides an overview of the current state of 
Chinese bankruptcy law from a comparative perspective and tries to discern some 
possible explanations for China’s inactive bankruptcy practice.  After introducing the 
major provisions under Chinese bankruptcy law and comparing them to their U.S. 
counterparts, this Note identifies several possible factors that could discourage 
bankruptcy practice in China, all of which relate to the overly broad judicial 
discretion and government involvement in Chinese bankruptcy practice. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2006, China passed a modern Enterprise Bankruptcy Law (2006 
EBL), which provides for a reorganization mechanism that allows a 
company to rearrange its business affairs without liquidation.1  With the 
recent global economic slowdown, reorganization cases have become a 
focus of legal studies in China.2  However, the reorganization practice in 
 
1 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Qiye Pochan Fa (中华人民共和国企业破产法) [Enterprise 
Bankruptcy Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 27, 2006, effective 
June 1, 2007), Lawinfochina (北大法律英文网), ch. 8 [hereinafter 2006 EBL]. 
2 For general discussion of reorganization in China by Chinese scholars after the passage of the new 
bankruptcy law, see Qi Ming (齐明), Lun Pochan Chongzheng Zhong de Gongsi Zhili (论破产重整中
的公司治理) [Corporate Governance in Insolvency Reorganization], 23 DANGDAIFAXUE (当代法学) 
[CONTEMP. L. REV.] 133 (2009); Wang Xinxin (王欣新), Chongzheng Zhidu Lilunyu Shiwu Xinlun (重
整制度理论与实务新论) [Contemporary Analysis of the Reorganization Theory and Practice], 11 
FALÜSHIYONG (法律适用) [J.L. APPLICATION] 10 (2012); Zhang Yanli (张艳丽), Chongzheng Jihua 
Bijiao Fenxi (重整计划比较分析) [Comparative Analysis about Reorganization Plan], 4 FaxueZazhi   
(法学杂志) [L. SCI. MAG.] 80 (2009); Zhao Hongren (赵泓任), Qiye Pochan Chongzheng Jihua 
Kexingxing de Falü Fenxi (企业破产重整计划可行性的法律分析) [Legal Analysis About the 
Feasibility for the Reorganization Plan of Corporate Bankruptcy], 6 FAXUEZAZHI (法学杂志) [L. SCI. 
MAG.] 137 (2010).  
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China is much less active than that in the United States.  In 2009, 
bankruptcy filings totaled 1,473,675 in the United States while the number 
of accepted bankruptcy applications in China reached only 2,434. 3  
Ironically, the number of accepted bankruptcy applications declined 
following the enactment of China’s new bankruptcy law.4  Through an 
analysis of the statute and various case studies, this Note analyzes reasons 
for that inactivity. 
China only passed its modern Bankruptcy Law seven years ago.5  
Thus, it faces many new challenges and shortcomings as compared to the 
much more advanced bankruptcy law system in the United States. 6  
Various reasons have been proposed for the relatively inactive bankruptcy 
practice in China;7 however, the fundamental reason seems to be China’s 
deep-rooted belief in collectivism and its tradition of allocating more active 
roles to the court and government throughout the dispute resolution 
process.8  Although China has made various efforts to move towards a 
more adversarial system so as to build an impartial judicial organ, it is still 
facing many difficulties with the prevalent inquisitorial system.9  The 
active roles of court and government agencies reflect the view that the 
dispute resolution system in China is a matter of collective concern rather 
than a private matter, which is rooted in the Chinese majoritarian 
preferences for social stability.10  It also illustrates a tendency in Chinese 
society to favor the interest of a group over individuals and to deemphasize 
private rights.11  This tendency leads to more discretion and power, both in 
the courts and in the government agencies. 12   In contrast, the U.S. 
 
3 Karen Redmond, Growth in Bankruptcy Filings Slows in Calendar Year 2010, U.S. COURTS (Feb. 15, 
2011), http://www.uscourts.gov/news/newsview/11-02-15/growth_in_bankruptcy_filings_slows_in_calendar_ 
year_2010.aspx; Cao Siyuan (曹思源), Qiye Pochan An Chuang 14 Nian Zuidi de Fansi (企业破产案创
14年最低的反思) [Examination of the Lowest Bankruptcy Case Number in 14 Years], 2 HU-GANG 
JING JI (沪港经济) [SHANGHAI & H.K. ECO.] 20 (2010).  
4 See Cao, supra note 3; see also Anna Ansari, The 2006 Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of the 
People’s Republic of China: A Further Step Toward the Creation of a Modern Insolvency Framework, 
20 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 5, art. 2 (2011) (stating that in 2008, 3,139 cases were accepted, while in 
2006, 4,300 cases were accepted). 
5 2006 EBL, supra note 1. 
6 Zhen Li, Zhongmei Pochan Chongzheng Zhidu Bijiao Yanjiu (中美破产重整制度比较研究) 
[Comparative Analysis of Chinese and U.S. Restructuring Systems] (Mar. 15, 2011) (unpublished 
master dissertation, Shandong University), available at http://www.doc88.com/p-187718730156.html. 
7 See Emily Lee, The Restructuring Process Under China’s Corporate Bankruptcy System, 45 
INT’L LAW. 939, 973 (2011) (“Attributive to this are a number of factors such as local protectionism, 
lack of qualified bankruptcy professionals in China, and certain judges’ inclination to apply the more 
familiar old bankruptcy law over the 2006 EBL.”). 
8 Ansari, supra note 4. 
9 See Randall Peerenboom, What Have We Learned About Law and Development? Describing, 
Predicting, and Assessing Legal Reforms in China, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 823, 844 (2006).  
10 Id. at 846. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
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adversarial system prefers an impartial role of the court or government 
agencies. 13   Disputing parties, acting primarily through their lawyers, 
dominate the litigation process rather than judges or government officials.14  
Specifically, the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, which was adopted in 1978, has 
transformed the bankruptcy court “from active participant to passive 
arbiter.”15 
 This Note focuses on the possible negative impact of the court’s active 
role and government agencies’ excessive involvement in reorganization 
practice in China.  The discussion proceeds as follows: Part II compares the 
initiating mechanism under the 2006 EBL and U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 
including who can file for a bankruptcy claim, what constitutes the 
necessary standards of bankruptcy, and how the automatic stay regime 
works.  This part notes that Chinese courts have broad discretionary power 
because only limited debtors can file for reorganization under the 2006 
EBL.  Filing standards for bankruptcy are also vague, which leaves much 
room for maneuvering.  More importantly, the automatic stay regime has 
serious limitations in China and thus is ineffective in practice.  Part III 
introduces one of the most important players during the reorganization 
process in China, the administrator.  After an overview of the administrator’s 
qualification and appointment process in China, Part III then compares its U.S. 
counterpart.  Part IV discusses the distribution plan under both the 2006 
EBL and U.S. Bankruptcy Code, highlighting that the 2006 EBL provides 
only limited distribution priorities arrangements to a debtor while the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code provides a broad range of possibilities.16  This reduces a 
debtor’s chance of getting financing necessary for rehabilitation in China.17  
Furthermore, flexible standards applicable to the confirmation of a 
reorganization plan reaffirm the court’s discretionary power.18  Part V 
continues with a brief overview of the possible exposure of a debtor’s 
management to civil liabilities in China, while Part VI studies the famous 
East Star Airline (ESA) case, which raised concerns about the court’s 
overly broad power and the government agency’s excessive involvement in 
bankruptcy cases. 19   Finally, Part VII concludes with the general 
 
13 Id. at 844. 
14 Robert A. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism: Tamed or Still Wild?, 2 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 
217, 220 (1998). 
15 Walter W. Miller, Jr., Bankruptcy Code Cramdown Under Chapter 11: New Threat to Shareholder 
Interests, 62 B.U. L. REV. 1059, 1066 (1982).  
16 Yongqing Ren, A Comparative Study of the Corporate Bankruptcy Reorganization Law of the 
U.S. and China 181 (July 14, 2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Groningen), 
available at http://irs.ub.rug.nl/ppn/334565847. 
17 Id. 
18 Wang Xinxin & Xu Yangguang (王新欣 & 徐阳光), Pochan Chongzheng Lifa Ruogan Wenti Yanjiu  
(破产重整立法若干问题研究 ) [Research on Issues on Bankruptcy Reorganization Legislation], 1 
ZHENGZHI YU FALV (政治与法律) [POL. SCI. & L.] 89, 93 (2007). 
19 See Gao Zhihong (高志宏), Kunjingyu Chulu: Woguo Pochan Guanliren Zhidu de Xianshi 
Kaocha (困境与出路：我国破产管理人制度的现实考察) [Problems and Solutions: A Practical 
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observation that, from a comparative perspective, the broad power of 
Chinese courts and the excessive involvement of government agencies 
might be the explanation for inactivity, although more needs to be seen 
given the limited passage of time since the 2006 EBL enactment. 
 
II.  INITIATING MECHANISM UNDER CHINESE AND U.S. 
BANKRUPTCY LAWS 
 
China introduced the concept of reorganization in its 1986 Enterprise 
Bankruptcy Law (Trial Implementation or 1986 EBL).20  However, under 
the 1986 EBL, the reorganization practice is only available to state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs).21  Also, there were only six provisions dealing with the 
reorganization process, with no detailed techniques and protective 
measures. 22   In response to the growing demand of private entity 
bankruptcies, China has enacted the 2006 EBL that became effective in 
2007.23  The current Chinese bankruptcy regime consists of the 2006 EBL, 
various administrative regulations, and judicial interpretations promulgated 
by the Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China (SPC).24 
The following subsections provide an overview of the current Chinese 
bankruptcy and reorganization regime as compared to U.S. laws.  
Specifically, Chinese courts have overly broad power because (1) only 
limited debtors can file for reorganization, (2) the standards of accepting a 
case are vague under the 2006 EBL, and (3) the automatic stay regime does 
not work as well in China given the fifteen-day window between a filing 
and the court’s final acceptance of a case. 
 
A.  The Limited Concept of Debtors in China 
 
The 2006 EBL applies to corporate entities, financial institutions, or 
other organizations.25  One important difference between the 2006 EBL and 
the 1986 EBL is that the 2006 EBL applies not only to SOEs, but also to 
 
Examination of China’s Bankruptcy Administrator System], 8 FAZHI YANJIU (法治研究) [RES. ON 
RULE OF L.] 60, 62 (2010). 
20 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Qiye Pochan Fa (Shixing) (中华人民共和国企业破产法 (试行)) 
[Enterprise Bankruptcy Law (Trial Implementation)] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Dec. 2, 1986, effective Mar. 2, 1987), Lawinfochina (北大法律英文网) [hereinafter 1986 EBL]. 
21 Id. art. 2; see also Wang Weidong (王卫东), Pochan Fa Shiyong Fanweizai Woguo de Bainian 
Licheng (破产法适用范围在我国的百年历程) [Research on the History of the Applicability of 
Bankruptcy Laws in China], 4 SHANGYESHIDAI (商业时代) [COMMERCIAL TIMES] 59, 60 (2008).  
22 1986 EBL, supra note 20, art. 2; see also Lijie Qi, The Corporate Reorganization Regime Under 
China’s New Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, 17 INT’L INSOLVENCY REV. 13, 15 (2008).  
23 2006 EBL, supra note 1; see also Xinlin Sun, Zhong Mei Ri Pochan Chongzheng Zhidu Zhi 
Bijiao Yanjiu (中美日破产重整制度之比较研究) [Comparative Research on Bankruptcy Restructuring 
System of China, America and Japan] (2006) (unpublished Master’s dissertation, Qingdao University). 
24 Lee, supra note 7, at 940. 
25 2006 EBL, supra note 1, arts. 2, 134. 
JIANG_FINAL_WORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/3/147:25 PM 
Northwestern Journal of 





private corporate entities.26  However, as the 2006 EBL only applies to 
organizations,27 natural persons who do not qualify for organization status 
cannot avail themselves of bankruptcy law’s protections.28 
Another breakthrough of the 2006 EBL is that it provided, for the first 
time, bankruptcy procedures for financial institutions.29   According to 
Article 134, financial institutions include, but are not limited to, 
commercial banks, securities companies, and insurance companies. 30  
However, only the State Council’s financial supervisory and regulatory 
institution may file for bankruptcy on behalf of financial institutions for 
either liquidation or reorganization.31  Thus, some scholars are skeptical 
about how useful the newly enacted financial institution bankruptcy 
proceedings will be in practice.32 
The U.S. Bankruptcy Code is embodied in Title 11 of the United 
States Code.33  It is divided into chapters: Chapters 1, 3, and 5 contain 
provisions that generally apply to all bankruptcy cases, and the remaining 
chapters set forth different procedures for distinct kinds of bankruptcy 
cases.34  Chapter 11 is designed to straighten out the affairs of corporations 
in financial distress and will be the focus of this Note.35  It provides a 
mechanism for shutting down distressed corporations and sorting out their 
financial difficulties in a coherent way.36 
According to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, only a person who resides in, 
or has a domicile, a place of business, or property in the United States may 
file for bankruptcy.37  Such “persons” include individuals, partnerships, and 
corporations, but not a government unit.38  Thus, although there are still 
concerns over the effectiveness of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code in resolving 
 
26 Id. art. 2. 
27 Id. 
28 See Rakhi I. Patel, A Practical Evaluation of the People’s Republic of China’s 2007 Enterprise 
Bankruptcy Law, 10 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J., 109, 112 (2010); Liu Dingfa & Wu Lei, Bad News for 
Debtors, 27 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 70 (2008); Zhu Shaoping (朱少平), Qiye Pochan Fa de Tiaozheng 
Fanwei (企业破产法的调整范围) [The Scope of Application of Enterprise Bankruptcy Law], WUHAN 
LIGONG DAXUE XUEBAO (武汉理工大学学报) [J. WUHAN U. TECH.] 4, 6 (2007). 
29 2006 EBL, supra note 1, art. 134.  For discussions urging the Chinese legislature to enact bankruptcy 
mechanisms for natural persons, see Qi Ming (齐明), Lun Woguo Goujian Ziranren Pochan Zhidu de 
Biyao Xing (论我国构建自然人破产制度的必要性) [The Necessity of Introducing Bankruptcy 
Mechanism for Natural Persons in China], 21 DANGDAIFAXUE (当代法学) [CONTEMPORARY L. REV.] 
94 (2007). 
30 2006 EBL, supra note 1, art. 134. 
31 Id. 
32 See Patel, supra note 28, at 114–15 (“[I]t is unlikely that we will see any of these institutions 
actually face bankruptcy in the near future.”). 
33 DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 4 (5th ed. 2010). 
34 Id. at 6. 
35 Id. at 18. 
36 Id. 
37 11 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2011). 
38 11 U.S.C. § 101(41) (2010). 
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failed complex financial institutions,39 no supervisory authority needs to 
file for bankruptcy on behalf of financial institutions.40  Unless a special 
regime is in place, such as those for banks or insurance companies, Chapter 
11 of the Bankruptcy Code remains the primary instrument for resolving 
bankruptcy of financial institutions.41  Furthermore, a natural person can 
also invoke bankruptcy law in the United States under Chapter 7 or Chapter 
13 of the Bankruptcy Code.42  The decision to separate the treatment of 
corporate and individual bankruptcy in the United States, however, does 
not imply that one is more important than the other.43  Rather, the division 
is in response to different policies and practices in these two categories.44  
Because human beings cannot be terminated the way corporate entities can, 
individual bankruptcy cases are oriented more towards the economic 
rehabilitation of the debtor than that of their corporate counterparts.45 
In this sense, the U.S. Bankruptcy Code applies to a broader group of 
people, with fewer restrictions, than the 2006 EBL in China.  This affords 
courts with less power to filter out reorganization cases at its discretion.46 
 
B.  Filing a Claim: Chinese Court’s Broad Discretion in Deciding 
Whether to Accept a Case 
 
In addition to the fact that only a selective group of people can file for 
bankruptcy, Chinese courts also have more power because debtors are 
given less opportunity to reorganize through the court system.  This is due 
to the fact that conversion from complete liquidation to reorganization is 
more difficult in China once a creditor files for liquidation.47  Furthermore, 
given the ambiguous standards that govern whether a court will “accept” a 
case under the 2006 EBL, a Chinese court has much more discretion than a 
U.S. court.48 
 
39 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-707, BANKRUPTCY: COMPLEX FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION POSE CHALLENGES (2011). 
40 See 11 U.S.C. § 109 (2011). 
41 Stephen J. Lubben, Financial Institutions in Bankruptcy, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1259, 1264 (2011).  
42 In contrast, an ordinary corporation can file either a Chapter 7 or a Chapter 11 petition.  
However, a corporation usually finds itself in Chapter 7 only after first having tried unsuccessfully to 
reorganize under Chapter 11.  BAIRD, supra note 33, at 17–18. 
43 ELIZABETH WARREN, CHAPTER 11: REORGANIZING AMERICAN BUSINESSES 3 (2008).  
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Li Dongfang & Zhang Lisha (李东方 & 张丽莎), Zhongwai Pochan Lifa Ruogan Zhongda Wenti 
de Bijiao (中外破产立法若干重大问题的比较) [Comparison of the Key Issues in Chinese and 
Foreign Bankruptcy Legislations], 10 CAIKUAI XUEXI (财会学习) [STUD. OF FINANCING & ACCT.] 19, 
19 (2006). 
47 Once a creditor has filed for liquidation in China, the debtor or its major capital contributor may 
not freely pursue reorganization, but must apply to the court to convert the ongoing liquidation 
proceeding to reorganization.  See 2006 EBL, supra note 1, art. 70. 
48 In China the bankruptcy test under the 2006 EBL is still ambiguous, while in the United States 
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1.  Debtor’s Restricted Access to Reorganization in China 
 
According to Article 7 of the 2006 EBL, both debtor and creditor may 
file for complete liquidation.49  A debtor may file for liquidation in two 
situations: (1) when the debtor cannot pay off the current debts due, and the 
assets are unavailable to pay off all of the debts, taking into account both 
the debts currently due and those that will become due in the future;50 and 
(2) when the debtor apparently lacks the ability to pay off his or her debts 
now or in the future, regardless of the debtor’s actual ability to pay.51  It is 
difficult to tell the difference between the two situations, though the second 
is easily met once a creditor has evidence to support a reasonable belief that 
the debtor cannot pay off his or her debts, even if the debtor is still 
generating income.52  The two tests for liquidation filings appear to be very 
vague, and the 2006 EBL provides no guidance on how to differentiate 
them. 53   This could be one aspect of the 2006 EBL where “further 
legislation or interpretation from the People’s Supreme Court of China” is 
needed.54  
A creditor may also file for involuntary liquidation against the debtor 
if the debtor fails to file for bankruptcy.55  A creditor may file these 
involuntary bankruptcy applications if the debtor cannot pay off his or her 
debts when they become due.56  Thus, unlike in the United States, there is 
no requirement that liabilities actually exceed assets in order to file for 
bankruptcy in China.57  However, when the creditor submits an involuntary 
application, the court must inform the debtor within five days of the filing 
date.58 
Similar to the U.S. mechanism, applications for liquidation and 
reorganization are closely related in China.  A debtor who meets either of 
the two tests for bankruptcy application may freely file for reorganization, 
unless the creditor has made an involuntary liquidation filing.59  Article 2 
also allows reorganization if the debtor has apparently forfeited the ability 
 
the courts have developed a clear financial distress standard.  See discussion infra Part II.B.2.  
49 2006 EBL, supra note 1, art. 7. 
50 Qi, supra note 22, at 17; Roger Frankel & Debra I. Felder, Close, But No Cigar, 26 INT’L FIN. L. 
REV. 48 (2007). 
51 2006 EBL, supra note 1, arts. 2, 7. 
52 2006 EBL, supra note 1, arts. 2, 7. 
53 Patel, supra note 28, at 112. 
54 See David L. Eaton et al., China’s New Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, 2 PRATT’S J. BANKR. L. 543, 
545 (2007). 
55 2006 EBL, supra note 1, art. 7. 
56 Id. 
57 Patel, supra note 28, at 113. 
58 2006 EBL, supra note 1, art. 10. 
59 Id. art. 2. 
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to pay off its debts.60  The application for reorganization can be filed either 
independently or during the liquidation proceeding.61  However, unlike its 
U.S. counterpart, the 2006 EBL does not allow flexible conversion from 
liquidation to reorganization.  Once the liquidation proceeding has been 
initiated by the creditor pursuant to Article 70 of the 2006 EBL, the debtor 
or its major capital contributor must apply to the court to convert the 
ongoing liquidation proceeding to reorganization to prevent the enterprise 
from being wound up.62  Thus, the court has the discretion to either convert 
the case or to continue the liquidation.63  It is not clear whether, or even 
how, the creditor may convert the case from liquidation into reorganization; 
the issue is not addressed by the 2006 EBL and case law is not a binding 
authority in China.64 
In the United States, both voluntary and involuntary filings are 
possible. 65   A voluntary case is commenced when a debtor files for 
bankruptcy.66  This commencement also serves as an “order for relief,” 
which means that a proper voluntary filing alone satisfies the conditions 
necessary for the automatic stay regime to apply and for a court to 
administer the case.67  In contrast, more conditions need to be met for 
involuntary filings,68 which require three or more creditors who hold non-
contingent claims against the debtor adding up to at least $14,425 of 
unsecured or under-secured debt.69  Furthermore, an involuntary filing does 
not constitute an order for relief.70  Rather, the bankruptcy court will only 
issue an order for relief if the petition is not “controverted” by the debtor.71  
If the petition is controverted, the court will order relief only if the debtor is 
“generally not paying” debts as such debts become due.72 
In addition to providing detailed guidance for involuntary filings, the 
U.S. Bankruptcy Code provides more opportunities for reorganization by 
allowing liquidation cases to be easily converted into reorganizations.73  
 
60 Id. 
61 Id. art. 70. 
62 Id.; see also Chen Bao, Comparative Studies of China’s Enterprise Bankruptcy Law and the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Law, 19 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 599, 605 (2010); Ren, supra note 16, at 189.  
63 2006 EBL, supra note 1, art. 70. 
64 John J. Rapisardi & Binghao Zhao, A Legal Analysis and Practical Application of the PRC 
Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, 11 BUS. L. INT’L 49, 50 (2010).  
65 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 303 (2010).  
66 Id. § 301. 
67 Id.; see also BARRY E. ADLER ET AL., BANKRUPTCY: CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS 66 
(4th ed. 2007). 
68 11 U.S.C. § 303. 
69 Id. § 301. 
70 ADLER ET AL., supra note 67, at 68.  
71 11 U.S.C. § 303(h). 
72 Id. § 303(h)(1). 
73 See In re Mead, 28 B.R. 1000, 1002 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (arguing that the policy goal of the case 
conversion sections in the Bankruptcy Code is to give the debtor the right and opportunity to conduct a 
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Debtors subject to an involuntary Chapter 7 liquidation filing enjoy an 
absolute right to convert that liquidation proceeding into a voluntary 
reorganization case, provided that they are otherwise eligible for relief 
under Chapter 11.74  By stipulating that any waiver of the right to convert a 
case is unenforceable, the U.S. Bankruptcy Code provides the debtor with 
more opportunities to reorganize.75  Such a conversion may be accomplished 
either before or after an order for relief has been entered in the involuntary 
case.76  Furthermore, unlike the 2006 EBL, under which a creditor may not 
convert a liquidation case into reorganization, the U.S. Bankruptcy Code 
allows any “party in interest” (including creditors and the U.S. Trustee) to 
request the court to convert voluntary or involuntary Chapter 7 proceedings 
into Chapter 11 proceedings at any time.77  Consequently, in the United 
States, debtors are given more opportunities to pursue reorganizations and 
the court has only limited power to prevent them from doing so. 
 
2.  The Chinese Court’s Broad Discretion in Deciding Whether to 
Accept a Case 
 
Another important difference between the U.S. and Chinese 
bankruptcy law is that, following a bankruptcy filing, a Chinese court has 
fifteen days to consider whether to accept the application and a bankruptcy 
case does not begin until it is accepted.78  This deadline can be extended to 
another fifteen days under special circumstances. 79   In contrast, a 
reorganization case formally begins in the United States when the debtor or 
a creditor files for bankruptcy.80  Thus, in the United States, the debtor may 
use voluntary filing strategically.81   Under the 2006 EBL, the debtor 
applies for bankruptcy, and the court has discretion whether to accept the 
application or not.82  Such a decision may not occur within fifteen days of 
the application, and the ambiguous rule regarding the two bankruptcy tests 
discussed in Part II.B.1 allows the Chinese court to have broad discretion 
over what criteria to use.83 
 
reorganization for the purpose of repaying debts). 
74 See generally W. HOMER DRAKE, JR. & KAREN D. VISSER, BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE FOR 
GENERAL PRACTITIONER §§ 6:7, 11:10 (3d ed. 2011); PATRICK A. MURPHY & ERIC SAGERMAN, 
CREDITORS’ RIGHTS IN BANKRUPTCY §§ 6:7, 4:8 (2d ed. 2012). 
75 11 U.S.C. § 706(a) (2010). 
76 See 11 U.S.C. § 1112(a)(2) (2010); 11 U.S.C. § 706(a). 
77 11 U.S.C. § 706(b). 
78 2006 EBL, supra note 1, art. 10. 
79 Id. 
80 11 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2005) (“A voluntary case under a chapter of this title is commenced by the 
filing with the bankruptcy court of a petition . . . by an entity that may be a debtor . . . .”). 
81 See William J. Woodward, Jr., “Control” in Reorganization Law and Practice in China and the 
United States: An Essay on the Study of Contrast, 22 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 141, 157 (2008). 
82 2006 EBL, supra note 1, art. 2 (emphasis added).  
83 2006 EBL, supra note 1, art. 2, 10 (“The people’s court shall decide whether or not to accept an 
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Given that a Chinese court is the ultimate arbiter of whether a case can 
proceed under the 2006 EBL, there is a compelling need for 
complementary rules to clarify what constitutes “apparently lacks the 
ability to pay off his debts” or “forfeited the ability to pay off his debts,” 
and what pleading burdens must be met. 84   Before the necessary 
clarifications are made by the SPC, the court still had broad discretion in 
deciding when and whether to accept bankruptcy cases.85  In contrast, in the 
United States, the standards are clear and rather easy to meet.  A filing 
must be made in good faith, or otherwise face dismissal.86  U.S. courts have 
developed a distinction between financial distress and economic distress, 
which provides a relatively clear guideline for determining whether a filing 
is made in good faith.87  “Financial distress” occurs when the firm does not 
have enough income to cover what it has borrowed, but the firm itself is 
working well in other aspects.88  In other words, financial distress means 
that the firm is suffering from a cash flow problem but maintains a 
successful business model.89  “Economic distress” occurs when a firm 
cannot generate sufficient revenue to pay its debts regardless of its capital 
structure.90  In other words, economic distress means that the firm has 
failed as a business or has a failing business model.91   A filing for 
reorganization in good faith is usually made when a firm is in financial 
distress rather than economic distress, because a failing business has 
nothing of value to save.92  Chinese bankruptcy law does not seem to 
address this issue in detail, though the requirements for filing to some 
extent illustrate the concept of economic distress.93  These vague standards 
therefore discourage bankruptcy filings, especially voluntary filings, which 
is a very important initiating mechanism for bankruptcy.94  In this way, the 




application for bankruptcy within 15 days from the date it receives the application.”). 
84 Qi, supra note 22, at 17. 
85 See Steven Arsenault, The Westernization of Chinese Bankruptcy: An Examination of China’s 
New Corporate Bankruptcy Law Through the Lens of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide to Insolvency 
Law, 27 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 45, 84–85 (2008).  
86 In re Integrated Telecom Express, Inc., 384 F.3d 108, 112 (3d Cir. 2004). 
87 Id. at 108. 
88 Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573, 580–81 (1998); see 
also Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision Making: An Empirical Study of Continuation Bias in 





93 See 2006 EBL, supra note 1, art. 2. 
94 See Woodward, Jr., supra note 81, at 157 (“Nearly all reorganization filings are voluntary.”). 
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C.  The Ineffective Automatic Stay Regime in China 
 
One of the most important goals of the bankruptcy law is to prevent a 
creditor’s race.95  Outside of bankruptcy law, the operative paradigm is 
“first in time is first in right.”96  Thus, whoever levies on a debtor’s assets 
first wins and gets paid before other creditors. 97   This preference 
arrangement, together with the fact that an insolvent firm usually does not 
have enough assets to meet its debt, creates an incentive for the creditors to 
race against each other to be the first to collect from the firm.98  This is the 
classic example of a “creditor’s race.”  A creditor’s race is itself destructive 
to the “going concern” value of the company because the creditors are 
likely to pursue the debtor’s assets at the same time, forcing piecemeal 
sales that may destroy whatever synergy existed between the assets.99  The 
U.S. Bankruptcy Code deals with this problem by implementing the 
automatic stay regime, which stays all efforts to sue on or collect from a 
debtor’s prepetition debt, or to put a lien on the debtor’s property.100 
In the United States, an automatic stay arises by operation of law the 
moment a debtor files a petition in a U.S. bankruptcy court.101  The 
automatic stay under Section 362 is drafted in the broadest terms possible, 
including “any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor 
that arose before the commencement of the case under this title.”102  
Furthermore, the stay operates as a prohibition against “all entities,” 
including sheriffs, U.S. marshals, collection agencies, and creditors who 
are owed the money.103 
The 2006 EBL has a similar framework for automatic stay, though 
only in limited circumstances and lacking detailed rules.104  Article 19, 
Article 20, Article 75, and Article 92 of the 2006 EBL set forth the 
 
95 ADLER ET AL., supra note 67, at 29.  A creditor’s race exists because of the collective action 
problem of the creditors, where they are trying “to get all of one’s own debt repaid, and let the devil 
take the hindmost,” which could destroy any going-concern value created by a firm.  In re Milwaukee 
Cheese Wis., Inc., 112 F.3d 845, 847 (7th Cir. 1997).  For arguments against justifying reorganizations 
with creditors’ collective action problem, see Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Bankruptcy Law For 
Productivity, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 51, 69 (2002).  
96 Charles Jordan Tabb, Rethinking Preferences, 43 S.C. L. REV. 981, 988 (1992).  
97 Id. 
98 See id. 
99 See David Gray Carlson, Bankruptcy Theory and the Creditors’ Bargain, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 453, 
464 (1992); Thomas H. Jackson, Of Liquidation, Continuation, and Delay: An Analysis of Bankruptcy 
Policy and Nonbankruptcy Rules, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 399, 399 (1986) (stating that the recognized goal 
of bankruptcy law is ensuring that creditors do not make a bad situation worse by engaging in a 
destructive race to the debtor’s assets).  
100 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2006); See also ADLER ET AL., supra note 67, at 104. 
101 11 U.S.C. § 362. 
102 Id. § 362(a)(6); see also WARREN, supra note 43, at 27. 
103 WARREN, supra note 43, at 27. 
104 See Eaton et al., supra note 54, 545–46. 
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automatic stay regime in China.105   After a Chinese court accepts an 
application for bankruptcy, measures for preserving the debtor’s property 
should be stayed and procedures for judicial execution should also be 
suspended.106  Similarly, any existing civil action or arbitration involving 
the debtor that has not yet concluded will be suspended.107  However, the 
action or arbitration may resume after an administrator takes over the 
debtor’s property.108 
During the process of reorganization, efforts to foreclose on security 
interests over specific property of a debtor are not allowed under the 2006 
EBL.109  However, in the case where possible damage or depreciation to the 
value of the collateral may impair the secured creditor’s rights, an 
application may be made to a court to preserve the secured property.110  
Where a creditor fails to claim his or her rights according to the provisions 
of the 2006 EBL, he or she may not exercise these rights when the 
reorganization is still ongoing.111 
Compared to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, the 2006 EBL is limited in 
the sense that it only covers judicial proceedings or arbitrations, not 
administrative proceedings or other non-adjudicative proceedings such as 
mediations. 112   Those other proceedings are covered under the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code.113  Thus, the U.S. Bankruptcy Code provides broader 
automatic stay protection. 
A more severe problem with the 2006 EBL automatic stay regime is 
that its application is seriously limited by the court’s discretionary power 
given the fifteen-day window.114  As discussed above, the court has fifteen 
days to rule on whether a bankruptcy application is accepted.115  The 
decision of accepting a case will not relate back to the date of filing.116  The 
automatic stay, however, does not arise until the court accepts the 
 
105 2006 EBL, supra note 1, arts. 19, 20, 75, 92. 
106 Id. art. 19. 
107 Id. art. 20. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. arts. 72, 75. 
110 2006 EBL, supra note 1, art. 75. 
111 Id. art. 92. 
112 Fu Cuiying (付翠英), Pochan Baoquan Zhidu Bijiao (破产保全制度比较) [Comparison of 
Bankruptcy Property Preservation Systems], 3 BIJIAOFA YANJIU (比较法研究) [J. COMP. L.] 25, 38–39 
(2008) (China). 
113 See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2006). 
114 2006 EBL, supra note 1, art. 10 (“Except for the circumstances as specified in the preceding 
paragraph, the people’s court shall decide whether or not to accept an application for bankruptcy within 
15 days from the date it receives the application.”). 
115 Id. 
116 Han Changying & Li Ling (韩长印&李玲), Jianlun Meiguo Pochan Fa Shang de Zidong Dongjie 
Zhidu (简论美国破产法上的自动冻结制度) [Introduction of Automatic Stay in the United States], 41 
HENAN DAXUE XUEBAO (河南大学学报) [J. HENAN UNIV.] 37, 39 (2001) (China). 
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application.117  This fifteen-day window creates a gap between the filing 
and acceptance of the application in which other creditors can continue to 
pursue collection efforts.118  In this sense, a bankruptcy filing essentially 
operates like a public announcement that invites all creditors to collect on 
their debts.119  Given the financial difficulties of a debtor in bankruptcy, 
creditors with early access to the filing will race to get their portion, which 
may result in piecemeal sales that destroy the synergy of the debtor’s 
business.120 
Consequently, debtors lose another important bargaining tool that they 
could use in negotiating with creditors.121  By deferring the application of 
an automatic stay, the court’s discretionary power may again discourage 
bankruptcy filings in China.122 
 
III.  DURING THE REORGANIZATION: THE LIMITED ROLE OF 
A BANKRUPTCY ADMINISTRATOR IN CHINA 
 
After a bankruptcy case is initiated, a Chinese court will appoint an 
“administrator”⎯similar to a trustee in the United States. 123  An 
administrator cannot resign without justifiable reasons and the resignation 
of an administrator is subject to approval by the Chinese court.124 
 
A.  The Qualification of Administrators 
 
 The SPC has promulgated several guidelines and regulations relating 
to the qualification, management, and appointment of administrators.125  
Every qualified administrator is registered in the administrator list, updated 
by relevant courts in China.126  A qualified administrator can be either an 
organization (i.e., a law firm, accounting firm, or bankruptcy-liquidation 
 
117 See, e.g., 2006 EBL, supra note 1, art. 19 (“After the people’s court accepts an application for 
bankruptcy, the measures for preserving the property of the debtor shall be lifted and the procedure for 
execution shall be suspended.”) (emphasis added); see also Cuiying, supra note 112, at 38.  
118 Patel, supra note 28, at 117. 
119 Changying & Ling, supra note 116, at 39. 
120 Id. 
121 See Woodward, Jr., supra note 81, at 157 (arguing that because debtors’ exercise of automatic 
stay powers convert creditors’ sunk costs on collection efforts into wasted expenses, it has the effect of 
encouraging negotiations between debtors and creditors). 
122 Zhang Yanli (张艳丽), Pochan Baoquan Zhidu de Heli Shezhi (破产保全制度的合理设置) 
[Restructuring of Bankruptcy Property Preservation System], 26 ZHENGFALUNTAN (政法论坛) [TRIB. 
POL. SCI. & L.] 42, 48 (2008) (China).  
123 2006 EBL, supra note 1, art. 13. 
124 Id. art. 29. 
125 See Lawrence (Lixin) Yang, Administrator in China’s New Enterprise Bankruptcy Law: Objective 
Standards to Limit Discretion and Expand Market Controls, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 533, 534 (2008). 
126 2006 EBL, supra note 1, art. 2. 
JIANG_FINAL_WORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/3/147:25 PM 






firm),127 or an individual with relevant knowledge and license.128  A special 
committee, which must consist of at least seven members from a court, will 
decide the list of administrators.129  The result will then be published 
through influential local media for ten days.130 
 
B.  The Appointment of Administrators 
 
Given the administrator’s substantial involvement and influence in the 
liquidation and reorganization process, there are detailed rules on the 
appointment of administrators in China.131  On one hand, the administrators 
appointed by the court are often local persons or entities tasked with 
ensuring that they are familiar with the local situation.132  They are also 
expected to have close ties to the company to render effective 
management.133  On the other hand, if the debtor is a commercial bank, 
securities company, or insurance company, the administrators will often be 
a non-local entity in order to ensure fairness.134  This also applies to cases 
with complicated legal issues or nationwide impact.135 
The administrator is appointed through a random drawing to avoid 
manipulation of the appointment or a potential conflict of interest.136  Once 
appointed, the administrator cannot refuse the appointment without a 
justifiable reason, which is intended to further ensure that the appointment 
is free from manipulation.137  Another way to maintain the administrator’s 
impartiality is to grant the court the power to set the administrator’s 
compensation.  As illustrated by the East Start Airline case, court controls 
the appointment process and the ultimately appointed administrators often 
 
127 See Yang, supra note 125, at 535; see also Charlie Xiao-Chuan Weng, To Be, Rather than to 
Seem: Analysis of Trustee Fiduciary Duty in Reorganization and Its Implications on the New Chinese 
Bankruptcy Law, 45 INT’L L. 647, 651 (2011) (“Most trustees are professionals from law firms and 
accounting firms.”). 
128 See Yang, supra note 125, at 535. 
129 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Qiye Pochan Anjian Zhiding Guanlirende Guiding (最高
人民法院关于审理企业破产案件指定管理人的规定) [The SPC’s Regulations on Appointment of 
Administrators in Enterprise Bankruptcy Cases] (promulgated by the SPC, effective June 1, 2007), 11, 
arts. 10–11 [hereinafter SPC Regulation on Appointment]. 
130 Id. 
131 See, e.g., 2006 EBL, supra note 1, arts. 22–29. 




136 Id. art. 28.  See Yang, supra note 125, at 542 (“[C]ourts that hear bankruptcy cases are required 
to appoint administrators randomly in one of three ways: waiting turns, drawing lots, and machine-
controlled lottery.”). 
137 SPC Regulation on Appointment, supra note 129, art. 28.  
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are closely related to the local government to add another level of 
control.138 
 
C.  Comparative Perspective: A Debtor’s Inability to Control 
Operations During Reorganizational Proceedings 
 
The active role of the Chinese court and government is clearly 
reflected in their control over a debtor’s operation during its reorganization 
process.139  The administrator, rather than the debtor, dominates 2006 EBL 
proceedings.  During the reorganization process, the debtor may, through 
his application and upon court approval, manage his property and business 
operations on his own under the supervision of an administrator. 140  
However, the debtor’s power is still limited in three ways141: (1) when the 
court accepts the reorganization application, it will also appoint an 
administrator; (2) even if the court decides to grant the debtor control over 
operations, such a decision usually takes time and the administrator retains 
the power to run the business during the interim; and (3) the debtor in 
control is still subject to the administrator’s supervision.142  Given that 
2006 EBL proceedings are administrator-oriented and the court has the 
exclusive power to appoint administrators, approve its resignation, and 
determine their fees, the court more or less controls the operation of the 
debtors throughout the process.143  Under the 2006 EBL, an administrator 
must manage the operations of the debtor and perform his duties according 
to the provisions of the law, report his work to the court, and is subject to 
supervision by the creditors’ meeting and the creditors’ committee.144 
In contrast, the U.S. Bankruptcy Code provides the debtor a debtor-in-
 
138 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Qiye Pochan Anjian Queding Guanliren Baochou de 
Guiding (最高人民法院关于审理企业破产案件确定管理人报酬的规定) [The SPC’s Regulations on 
the Compensation of Administrators in Enterprise Bankruptcy Cases] (promulgated by the SPC, Apr. 4, 
2007, effective June 1, 2007), Lawinfochina (北大法律英文网) (China). 
139 See Deng Yanjun (邓艳君), Lun Woguo Xin Pochan Fa Zhong Renmin Fayuan Dingwei de 
Queshiji Wanshan (论我国新破产法中人民法院定位的缺失及完善) [Discussion on the Lack of Neutral 
Position of People’s Court in 2006 EBL and Suggested Improvements], 3 JISHOUDAXUEXUEBAO (吉首大学
学报) [J. JISHOU U.] 59, 60 (2010) (China); Qi Ming (齐明), Chongzheng Qijian Gongsi Kongzhi Quan 
Eryuan Moshi Tanjiu (重整期间公司控制权二元模式探究) [The Dual Control Model in Corporate 
Governance During Reorganization], 37 QIUSHI (求是) [SEEKING TRUTH] 95, 99 (2010) (China). 
140 2006 EBL, supra note 1, art. 73. 
141 See Jin Chun (金春) et al., Pochan Chongzheng Chengxu Zhong de Guanliren Zhidu (破产重整
程序中的管理人制度) [The Administrator System in Reorganization], 28 ZHENGFALUNTAN (政法论坛
) [TRIB. POL. SCI. & L.] 52, 55 (2010). 
142 Id. 
143 2006 EBL, supra note 1, arts. 13, 22; see also Qi, supra note 22, at 17; Zou Linhai (邹林海), 
Xin Qiye Pochan Fayu Guanliren Zhongxin Zhuyi (新企业破产法与管理人中心主义) [The New 
Bankruptcy Law and the Administrator Oriented Approach], 49 HUADONG ZHENG FA XUEYUAN 
XUEBAO (华东政法学院学报) [J. E. CHINA U. POL. SCI. & L.] 121, 122 (2010).   
144 2006 EBL, supra note 1, arts. 23, 25, 29. 
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possession (DIP) status with the powers of a bankruptcy trustee.145  In most 
cases, a DIP may run the business in the “ordinary course” as it sees fit.146  
Congress argued that in many cases creditors would benefit from the DIP 
legislation in both saved expenses and business continuity, which results 
from precluding a change in management and avoiding the substantial 
learning curve of new management.147  In contrast, the Chinese system 
prevents both the creditors and debtors from enjoying those benefits.148 
Some scholars call the Chinese Bankruptcy Administrator model a 
“modified debtor-in-possession approach.”149  However, such a name is 
misleading in that it conceals the fact that the debtor does not have a 
favorable position in proposing a reorganization plan.150  In the United 
States, the DIP has exclusive rights within 120 days to propose a 
reorganization plan and the court usually extends that time.151  In China, 
however, most of the time the administrator will propose the reorganization 
plan notwithstanding a lack of familiarity with the debtor’s operation in the 
past or the industry in general.152 
Furthermore, the crux of the problem is the absence of judicial 
autonomy and independence, which is an overriding concern in enforcing 
the 2006 EBL.153  In one of the SPC’s opinions, the court was encouraged 
to cooperate with local government authorities in order to resolve the 
challenging issues that arise in the context of bankruptcy proceedings.154  
However, local government interference is one of the fundamental 
obstacles to the enforcement of the 2006 EBL.155  In China, a debtor must 
usually seek the approval of a local government before it files for 
 
145 Woodward, Jr., supra note 81, at 147. 
146 Id. 
147 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 233 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963.  
148 See Qi Ming & Qiu Xiaoguang (齐明 & 仇晓光), Woguo Pochan Fa Zhong Ziyuan Pochan 
Yuanze de Fansi yu Chonggou (我国破产法中自愿破产原则的反思与重构) [The Reflection and 
Reconstruction of the Voluntary Bankruptcy Principles under the EBL], 246 DONGBEI SHIDA XUEBAO  
(东北师大学报) [J. NE. NORMAL U. (PHIL. & SOC. SCI.)] 29 (2010). 
149 Charles D. Booth, Bankruptcy Laws in Socialist Market Economies, 18 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 93, 
129 (2004).  
150 Zhang, supra note 2, at 81 (stating that both the creditor and administrator may propose a 
reorganization plan). 
151 Theodore Eisenberg & Stefan Sundgren, Is Chapter 11 Too Favorable to Debtors? Evidence 
from Abroad, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1532, 1549 (1997).  
152 Li, supra note 6.  
153 Rapisardi & Zhao, supra note 64, at 57. 
154 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Zhengque Shenli Qiye Pochan Anjian Wei Weihu Shichang 
Jingji Zhixu Tigong Sifa Baozhang Ruogan Wenti de Yijian (最高人民法院关于正确审理企业破产案
件为维护市场经济秩序提供司法保障若干问题的意见) [The SPC’s Opinion on Correctly Hearing 
Enterprise Bankruptcy Cases and Preserving the Order of the Market Economy by Offering Judicial 
Guarantee] (promulgated by the SPC, June 12, 2009, effective June 12, 2009), available at 
http://www.court.gov.cn/qwfb/sfwj/yj/201002/t20100224_1927.htm; see also Rapisardi & Zhao, supra 
note 64, at 57. 
155 Rapisardi & Zhao, supra note 64, at 57. 
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reorganization.156  Furthermore, a court must ask for help from the local 
government to coordinate with creditors, especially banks, to facilitate the 
reorganization process.157  Support from the local government is therefore a 
key factor in achieving success in a reorganization case.158  Thus, Chinese 
courts must accommodate two seemingly conflicting values: cooperating 
with local governments and maintaining judicial independence.159 
Additionally, some scholars point out that under the 2006 EBL’s 
ambiguous threshold for accepting bankruptcy applications, outside forces 
and political parties continue to put pressure on the courts.160  For example, 
sometimes even the SPC issues opinions that explicitly require courts to 
cooperate with administrative agencies to resolve challenging issues in the 
context of bankruptcy.161  It is also worth noting that the government has 
easier ways to participate in the bankruptcy proceeding.  For example, 
according to Article 24 of the 2006 EBL, the administrator can be a 
liquidation team composed of persons from relevant departments, including 
a certified public accountant firm, a bankruptcy liquidation firm, or any 
other public agency.162  Thus, the court may directly designate persons 
from the relevant departments of the government, which allows a more 
direct and active role for the government.163 
 
IV.  DISTRIBUTION: PRIORITIES, VOTING, AND CRAMDOWN 
 
Under the previous Chinese bankruptcy regime, employees were paid 
first using the proceeds from the sale of assets and given priority over 
secured creditors.164  The court would often waive the secured creditors’ 
claims in the bankruptcy proceedings to guarantee the priority given to 
employees’ claims.165   Thus, protection of the priority of the secured 
creditors over employees’ claims is one important improvement to 
creditors’ rights under the 2006 EBL.166  The 2006 EBL explicitly provides 
that “[a] creditor secured by the specific property of the bankrupt shall 
enjoy the priority in being repaid with the specific property.”167  After the 
 
156 Wang Jianping & Zhang Dajun (王建平 & 张达君), Pochan Chongzheng Jihua Pizhun Zhiduji 
Fansi (破产重整计划批准制度及反思) [Reflection on Reorganization Plan Confirmation System], 23 
RENMIN SIFA (人民司法) [PEOPLE’S JUDICATURE] 52, 53 (2010).  
157 Id. 
158 Id. 
159 Rapisardi & Zhao, supra note 64, at 57. 
160 See, e.g., Ansari, supra note 4. 
161 Rapisardi& Zhao, supra note 64, at 57. 
162 2006 EBL, supra note 1, art. 24. 
163 Yongqing Ren, The “Control Model” in Chinese Bankruptcy Reorganization Law and Practice, 
85 AM. BANKR. L.J. 177, 182 (2011). 
164 Liu & Wu, supra note 28, at 70. 
165 Rapisardi & Zhao, supra note 64, at 50.  
166 See Liu & Wu, supra note 28, at 70; Patel, supra note 28, at 113. 
167 2006 EBL, supra note 1, art. 109. 
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secured creditors have been paid and after deductions of bankruptcy 
expenses and debts of common benefits from the bankruptcy property, 
repayment shall be made in the following order: (1) employees’ claims; (2) 
social security expenses and insurance claims; and (3) unsecured claims.168 
However, the employees’ claims remain a high priority even though 
they are now subordinated to secured claims.169  Article 6 sets out the 
policy that the court shall, in accordance with law, guarantee the legitimate 
rights and interests of the employees.170  Moreover, as a compromise, the 
2006 EBL provides that employees’ claims incurred before August 27, 
2006 shall still enjoy priority over secured creditors if they cannot be 
satisfied out of the debtor’s assets.171 
As for the voting regime, creditors who declare claims are members of 
the creditors’ meeting and may exercise voting rights.172  A simple majority 
of the creditors whose claims represent more than two-thirds of the debt 
amount may approve the draft plan.173 
Cramdown, or a nonconsensual plan confirmation, happens when one 
or more groups of creditors vote against the confirmation of a plan, but the 
plan may nonetheless be approved when other conditions are met.174  Under 
the 2006 EBL, where a draft plan is not approved, a second voting may be 
convened after negotiation.175  If a plan still fails the second voting, a 
Chinese court may approve the plan over the objections of the dissenting 
classes, provided that the following six criteria are met176: (1) the secured 
creditors will be paid in full or be compensated in a fair manner, without 
substantial impairment to the security interests,177 or are in such a class as 
has consented to the plan; (2) the employees’ claims and tax claims will be 
paid in full or are in such a class as has consented to the plan; (3) the 
unsecured creditors will get at least the same amount as under the 
 
168 2006 EBL, supra note 1, art. 113; see also Qi, supra note 22, at 23.  
169 Roman A. Tomasic, The Conceptual Structure of China’s New Corporate Bankruptcy Law, in 
CHINA’S NEW ENTERPRISE BANKRUPTCY LAW: CONTEXT, INTERPRETATION, AND APPLICATION 30 
(Rebecca Parry ed., 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1546556 
(“This employee protection principle [in Article 6 gives] employee claims a higher priority than normal 
unsecured claims, such as those of trade creditors.”). 
170 2006 EBL, supra note 1, art. 6. 
171 2006 EBL, supra note 1, art. 132; see also Liu & Wu, supra note 28, at 72. 
172 2006 EBL, supra note 1, art. 59; see also Qi, supra note 22, at 21.  
173 2006 EBL, supra note 1, art. 84; see also Qi, supra note 22, at 21. 
174 See Isaac M. Pachulski, The Cram Down and Valuation Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy 
Code, 58 N.C. L. REV. 925, 925 (1979–80); WARREN, supra note 43, at 155.  For the conditions that 
must be satisfied in the United States to proceed with a cramdown, see Richard F. Broude, Cramdown 
and Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code: The Settlement Imperative, 39 BUS. LAW. 441 (1984). 
175 2006 EBL, supra note 1, art. 87. 
176 Id. 
177 This seems to be the functional parallel of the U.S. “fair and equitable test,” which means that a 
court can confirm a plan only if the plan is fair and equitable and does not discriminate unfairly.  See 11 
U.S.C § 1129(b)(2) (2010). 
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liquidation regime,178 or are in such a class as has consented to the plan; (4) 
the adjustment made to the rights and interests of investors is fair and just 
or are in such a class as has consented to the plan; (5) members of the same 
voting group are treated fairly; and (6) the reorganizational plan is 
feasible.179 
The 2006 EBL voting requirements and conditions of a cramdown 
case closely resemble the standards in the United States.180  Because of 
Chinese courts’ tradition of closely monitoring a case, the discretionary 
criteria under the cramdown regime may offer another possibility for the 
court to use its power.181  Furthermore, in the United States, assets are 
distributed first to secured creditors and then to unsecured creditors.182  
However, unsecured claims in the United States cover a broader group of 
claims as compared to the 2006 EBL, including administrative expenses 
incurred to help administer the case and new financing acquired after 
bankruptcy filings to facilitate reorganization.183  Both the administrative 
expenses and newly acquired financing take priority to pre-filing unsecured 
claims.184  These additional priority options are powerful tools for a debtor 
in the United States to bargain for better post-filing financing terms, as 
lenders are more likely to provide loans that have priority over pre-filing 
unsecured claims.185  As a result, the failure of the 2006 EBL to provide 
special priority to post-filing financing limits the administrator’s ability to 
get better financing that is critical for the debtor’s rehabilitation.186 
 
V.  AFTER REORGANIZATION: MANAGEMENT’S POTENTIAL 
EXPOSURE TO CIVIL LIABILITIES 
 
Another discouraging factor for filing bankruptcy petitions under the 
2006 EBL is its treatment of the debtor’s management members.  The 2006 
EBL does not grant much power to the debtor’s management during the 
 
178 This is similar to the U.S. “best interests test,” which states that an individual dissenter can get at 
least the same amount he would have received under liquidation.  See id. § 1129 (a)(7)(A); ADLER ET 
AL., supra note 67, at 675.  
179 This is similar to the “feasibility test” in the United States, meaning that a court may not confirm a 
plan unless the court is satisfied that confirmation is not likely to be followed by the liquidation or further 
reorganization of the debtor.  See 11 U.S.C § 1129 (a)(11); ADLER ET AL., supra note 67, at 683. 
180 See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c), 1129 (2010).  
181 Wang & Xu, supra note 18, at 93. 
182 11 U.S.C. §§ 725, 726 (2010).  
183 Id. §§ 507, 726, 364(c). 
184 Id. §§ 507, 726, 364(c). 
185 Studies have found that there is a direct relation between DIP financing and the success of 
reorganization under Chapter 11.  See Fayez A. Elayan & Thomas O. Meyer, The Impact of Receiving 
Debtor-in-Possession Financing on the Probability of Successful Emergence and Time Spent Under 
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 28 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCOUNT. 905, 934 (2001), available at http://homes.chass. 
utoronto.ca/~szhou/print/DIPjournalBusFinAcc.pdf. 
186 Id. 
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reorganization process.187  Instead, it prescribes possible civil penalties of 
the debtor’s management members together with their duty to answer 
questions in creditors’ meetings and to remain in the same domicile 
throughout the reorganization process.188   The penal system reflects a 
strong monitoring by the court and the government.189  Thus, management 
in China appears to “lack[] incentives to either acknowledge financial 
problems prior to bankruptcy” or to remain in position to help 
administrators operate the debtor after filing.190  This again harms the 
bankruptcy practice in China because the managers are usually the best 
source of information about the company’s operations and most likely to 
file for bankruptcy, though they may have caused the problems that 
ultimately led to the financial difficulty.191 
 
VI.  CASE STUDIES: WHY DOES EAST STAR AIRLINE HAVE 
TO LIQUIDATE?  
 
The discussions above illustrate how Chinese courts and government 
agencies have broad discretionary powers in the reorganization proceeding.  
Sometimes, however, the expected practice and the actual practice that 
emerges can diverge.192  Thus, a close examination of actual cases may 
shed light on how the 2006 EBL works in practice. 
As for the Chinese government agencies’ involvement in the 
bankruptcy proceedings, the Qinling reorganization case serves as a 
prominent example.193  The liquidation panel as appointed by the court only 
consisted of two professionals, namely one lawyer and one financial 
consultant.194  Other members of the panel consisted of 22 government 
officials from different bureaus and departments. 195   These officials 
included deputy mayors, a dean, a deputy dean of the state-owned assets 
supervision and administration commission, and deputy directors of the 
environment bureau. 196   This shows how active a role the Chinese 
government plays in bankruptcy proceedings.197   Similarly, in another 
recent reorganization case involving Jinxing Real Estate Corporation in 
Zhejiang Province, the district government—rather than the debtor itself—
 
187 See 2006 EBL, supra note 1. 
188 Id. arts. 15, 23, 125. 
189 Li, supra note 6.  
190 Patel, supra note 28, at 120. 
191 Id. 
192 Woodward, Jr., supra note 81, at 150. 
193 SHANGHAI SEC. EXCH., PUBLIC NOTICE ON MATTERS CONCERNING REORGANIZATION ISSUED BY 
SHAANXI QINLING CEMENT (GROUP) CORP. LTD. (2009) (on file with author). 
194 Id. 
195 Id. 
196 Id.; see also Ren, supra note 16, at 65. 
197 Ren, supra note 16, at 65. 
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made an announcement to creditors and led negotiations between the 
creditors and the debtor, reflecting the government’s involvement in that 
case.198  These practices, together with the court’s broad power in deciding 
whether to accept a case and monitoring administrators, place the debtor in 
an extremely uncertain situation where the debtor may not want to risk 
filing for reorganization because he may lose control of his business, which 
is what exactly happened in the Eastern Star Airline (ESA) case.  
The ESA case serves as one of the best illustrations of how the 
Chinese court and government both exercise control over a debtor.  ESA is 
a privately owned airline in China that became financially distressed in 
2008 and was forced to cease operations in March 2009.199  The court 
accepted the involuntary bankruptcy application filed by ESA’s creditors, 
including General Motors, on March 27, 2009.200 
The court-appointed administrator consisted of various governmental 
authorities, including the Wuhan Transportation Commission, the 
Legislative Affairs Bureau, the Wuhan Labor Union, and the Public Safety 
Bureau.201  The debtor and the administrator had very different views about 
the economic conditions of ESA.202  The debtor had been aggressively 
seeking reorganization by proposing two plans with the help of main 
creditors and strategic investors.203   The first reorganization plan was 
proposed in July 2007, with the consent of ten main creditors led by China 
Aviation Oil Group and joined by a main investor, Wuhan Hongxing 
International Travel Company.  The first plan proposed conversion of debt 
to equities and loan extensions, together with new investments, but was 
soon replaced by the second plan.204  The second reorganization plan was 
proposed in August 2009, with financing of RMB200 million to RMB300 
million provided by a main investor, China Equity Group.205  This plan 
 
198 Yuhang Jinxing Fangchan Shenqing Pochan Qingsuan (余杭金星房产申请破产清算) [Yuhang 
Jinxing Real Estate Corp. Has Applied for Bankruptcy], SOHU (Apr. 10, 2012), http://roll.sohu.com/ 
20120410/n3401 41005.shtml. 
199 Ren, supra note 16, at 186; Xiong Jinchao (熊金超), Dongxing Hangkong Gongsi Yin Wuli 
Huanzhai Bei Zanting Yunying (东星航空公司因无力还债被暂停运营) [ESA is Forced to Stop 
Operation Because of Lack of Ability to Pay for the Debts Due], SINA (Mar. 15, 2009), 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/ chanjing/b/20090315/08115977604.shtml. 
200 Xiong, supra note 199. 
201 Ren, supra note 16, at 186–87; Gao, supra note 19, at 62. 
202 The debtor claimed that with the cooperation of main debtors and injection of new financing, 
ESA will be able to survive the current difficulties.  The administrator insisted that reorganization was not 
viable as ESA had huge amount of debts and had lost its airplanes and routes.  See Liu Weixun (刘伟勋), 
Dongxing Hangkong Shengsi 150 Ri (东星航空生死 150日) [The Life or Death of ESA in 150 Days], SINA 
(Aug. 28, 2009), http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/sdbd/20090828/23096680123.shtml. 
203 See Li Fengtao (李凤桃), Zhaiquan Ren Bianshen Zhanlüe Touzi Zhe Zhong Hang You 
“Yingjiu” Dongxing Hangkong (债权人变身战略投资者中航油”营救”东星航空) [From Debtor to 
Strategic Investor, China Aviation Oil’s Effort to Save ESA], SOHU (July 20, 2009), http://business.sohu.com/ 
20090720/ n265329694.shtml. 
204 Id. 
205 See Gao, supra note 19, at 61; Zhang Da (张达), Dongxing Hangkong Xin Chongzu Fang 
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proposed to use these funds to lease three airplanes in order to solve the 
current financial difficulties.206  After ESA recovered, the management 
would introduce international airlines as strategic investors and diversify 
ESA’s shareholders by going public within the next three to five years.207  
The second plan was later amended on August 25, 2009 as a final effort to 
persuade the court.208  In the amended second plan, China Equity Group 
would receive 70%–80% of the equity shares of ESA while ESA’s 
creditors would convert their debt into 20%–30% of ESA’s equity shares, 
and the original shares of ESA would be converted into debt.209 
While ESA and its creditors were making efforts to save the 
corporation, the administrator repeatedly announced that there was no hope 
of reorganizing.210  Despite the debtor’s efforts and desire to secure a 
reorganization plan, the court ordered the liquidation rather than 
reorganization of ESA in August 2009, only five months after its 
bankruptcy filing.211  After this case, some critics argued that this was a 
forced liquidation and that there should be more limits on the power of the 
Chinese administrator.212 
The practical examples above illustrate how Chinese courts and 
government officials play an active role in bankruptcy proceedings, 
discouraging debtors from initiating or entering into the reorganization 
proceedings.  Though some scholars argue that the differences between the 
U.S. and Chinese models are not very large,213 the above case studies seem 
to suggest otherwise.  Indeed, one can still feel the pronounced negative 
impact of the current EBL model on the initiation and administration of 
bankruptcy proceedings in China.214 
 
 
Xinzhongli Jituan Xianshen (东星航空新重组方信中利集团现身) [Dongxing’s New Reorganization 
Participant—China Equity Group], SINA (Aug. 18, 2009), http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/gsnews/ 
20090818/06566 629278.shtml. 
206 Zhang Jie (张杰), Dongxing Hangkong Pochan An Falü Wenti Yanjiu (东星航空破产案法律问
题研究) [Legal Analysis of ESA Bankruptcy Case], 4 ZHENGQUAN FAYUAN (证券法苑) [SEC. L. REV.] 
384, 386 (2011); Liu, supra note 202. 
207 Liu, supra note 202.  
208 Id.  
209 Id. 
210 Cui Xiaohong (崔晓红), Shuizai Daoyang Dongxing Pochan (谁在导演东星破产) [Who is 
Directing ESA to Bankruptcy], SINA (Aug. 11, 2009), http://finance.sina.com.cn/review/observe/20090811/ 
14516601190.shtml.  
211 Wuhan Zhongyuan Caiding Dongxing Hangkong Pochan Qingsuan (武汉中院裁定东星航空破
产清算) [The Intermediary Court of Wuhan Ordered Liquidation of ESA], SINA (Aug. 27, 2009), 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/gsnews/20090827/10146671931.shtml. 
212 Gao, supra note 19, at 65. 
213 E.g., Ren, supra note 16, at 179–81 (arguing (1) that the U.S. DIP is subject to challenge and 
may be replaced by a trustee, and thus a Chinese debtor does not necessarily enjoy fewer opportunities 
with respect to becoming a DIP; and (2) that the Chinese DIP system is “basically a modified DIP 
approach”). 
214 See Gao, supra note 19, at 65. 
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VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
Based on both statutory analysis and case studies, this Note identifies 
the excessive involvement of Chinese courts and government agencies in 
bankruptcy proceedings.  This overly broad power is often felt throughout a 
reorganization case.  When initiating these cases, the court has broad power 
to decide whether to accept a case within fifteen days.  The vague filing 
standards under the 2006 EBL leave the court with broad discretion.  
Furthermore, this fifteen-day window prevents effective implementation of 
the automatic stay regime under the 2006 EBL. 
After a case has been initiated, the court then has exclusive power to 
appoint and remove the administrator who will manage a debtor’s business 
throughout the reorganization proceedings.  Furthermore, the administrators 
often are government agencies.  By closely monitoring activities of the 
administrator, Chinese courts and government agencies in fact control a 
debtor’s management during the reorganization process.  In addition, the 
distribution plan and voting requirements under the 2006 EBL also give 
limited options to debtors to acquire post-filing financing and provide 
broad power for a court to confirm a plan over dissenting creditors.  Finally, 
after reorganization in China, the debtor’s management members may face 
possible civil liabilities, further dissuading them from filing for reorganization. 
All of these factors show tremendous discretionary power of the court 
and government agencies during reorganization proceedings, which may 
explain the inactive bankruptcy practice in China.  It is worth noting, 
however, that reorganization practice in China is still a developing concept 
and much of the above analysis is largely theoretical.  Explanations offered 
here may prove incomplete or inaccurate with emerging practices.  Still, 
understanding the 2006 EBL from a comparative perspective is of great 
importance to China, both today and in the future. 
 
 
